Introduction
'He started it! Yeah, but she hit me first!' This is perhaps an all too familiar scenario for those who have ever been around children.
Who is more aggressive -the child who supposedly initiated the tussle or the one who threw the first punch? Although the conflict predates the violence, the introduction of violence into the dispute delineates an important junction within the conflict that changes the nature of the interaction, for 'escalation raises the expected cost associated with a failure to settle and also creates the opportunity for a protagonist to seize everything it wants' (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992: 9) . The first use of violence is, thus, unambiguously an act of aggression representing an escalation of violence within the dispute.
With the introduction of our first use of violent force (FUVF) variable to be used in conjunction with the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn & Palmer, 2003) , we seek to identify which state or states in an interstate dispute escalated the level of conflict to include violence. In other words, we identify the first act of violence during disputes rather than focusing on dispute onset. Herein, we introduce the FUVF variable, justify its usefulness, and draw attention to patterns worthy of further study.
Filling a Void
Although MID provides a Side A variable identifying the state that first initiated militarized action in a conflict, FUVF allows scholars to differentiate between picking the fight and throwing the first punch. As such, the first use of violent force variable allows for a detailed examination of conflict behavior beyond conflict initiation. FUVF also goes beyond the MID hostility level variable, which identifies the highest level of militarized action taken, including the threat and use of force. The hostility level variable does not identify which state first used violence, thus scholars cannot isolate the first use of violent force from the reciprocal use of violence. Indeed, a defensive use of violence is not necessarily one of aggression. FUVF isolates states' international aggressive behavior beyond a state's tit-for-tat reaction to violence. Having identified the disputant using violent force first, it then becomes possible to begin to identify the characteristics of states that are more likely to introduce violence into an interstate dispute, which, in turn, may increase our ability to predict which disputes are more likely to turn violent.
More specifically, the first use of violent force variable allows for the systematic assessment of domestic level factors on state behavior precisely because FUVF isolates aggressive use of violence from the reciprocal use of force. Thus, FUVF may reflect societal factors, such as norms of equality (Caprioli, 2000 (Caprioli, , 2003 Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003a; Marshall & Ramsey, 1999; Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003) and observance of accepted human rights norms (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003a,b) , which may help predict the use of violence internationally. At the same time, first use of violence as a form of aggression may be driven by different dynamics than other problematic state-level behaviors, such as support for terrorism or illicit pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005) .
Another virtue of FUVF is the ability to use it to examine state-level characteristics that predict violence beyond the characteristics of the dispute itself. For instance, territorial disputes are more likely to turn violent than disputes not driven by competition over territory. Obviously, both sides of a territorial dispute are faced with the same issue and structural constraints, yet one side chooses to use violence first. What scholars have been unable to ascertain, before FUVF, is what propels a state to introduce violence into the dispute.
FUVF and FUVF-related variables, identifying the target of violence (TAFUVF) and date violence was first used (DFUVF), can help us to understand conflict behavior more generally: For instance, are international pariah or rogue states more likely to use violence first, or are they instead more likely to be the targets of aggressive policies of confrontation or containment directed against them? Are states that adopt a strategy of using violence first during a MID more likely to win? Are states defending the international status quo more likely to be targets of the first use of violent force, or are they more likely to strike pre-emptively in defense of the status quo? Is there actually an escalatory process during conflict, or is violence more likely to be introduced at the conflict onset? In short, the main FUVF variable and associated indicators can be used to help examine state aggression, the international use of violent force, and the escalation of conflict behavior.
FUVF may also be useful in addressing some of the criticisms levied at either MID or studies examining the issue of conflict initiation. For example, Rasler & Thompson (1999) argue that such scholarship must address the possibility that some targets escaped attack. As the FUVF variable can be used to examine the escalation to violence by states already locked in a dispute, we now have information on those states that escaped attack.
Creating FUVF
While no dataset is perfect, MID is an oftused, well-respected dataset within conflict studies. Therefore, we decided to create the first use of violent force variable to be used in conjunction with MID. We define FUVF as the first use of military violence within a MID by one system member-state toward another system member-state. FUVF is coded as the first state to use military violence in an international dispute (MID hostility level codes 4 and 5) and offers a more specific analysis of violence rather than the more general escalation of hostility codings. This dichotomous state-level variable is coded 1 if the state was the first to use violent force, and 0 otherwise.
The FUVF variable currently spans the 1980-2001 period. As such, FUVF encompasses ten years of the bipolar, Cold War era and 12 years of the post-Cold War period, thereby facilitating an examination of patterns of first use of violent force during periods characterized by different systemic structures. We are currently engaged in coding FUVF backward in time to include more disputes from the Cold War period, but because of data limitations, this effort is more difficult and time-consuming than the creation of the initial 1980-2001 dataset. From 1980 onward, however, a great deal of information is available in the form of readily accessible electronic news databases, such as Lexis-Nexis, thus allowing for a more scientific, systematic examination of the first use of violence and for greater reliability and validity.
To build the dataset on first use of violent force, we began with the set of all MIDs from 1980 through 2001. All states involved in disputes in which violence was not used were coded as no first use of violent force. In other words, we focus on those MIDs in which violence was used -those scoring 4 (the use of force) or 5 (war) for hostility level. Thus, states involved in MIDs in which there was no militarized use of force, threat to use force, or display of force were coded as 0, no first use of violent force. In those disputes in which only one state used violence, it was coded as first user of force by default.
For those disputes in which both sides used force, first use was determined by collecting contemporary news accounts using the parties to the dispute and dispute start and end dates as recorded in the original MID data as standard Lexis-Nexis search parameters. Determination of first use is based on broad agreement on the facts between separate accounts from independent news organizations, or confirmation of the facts of a case from multiple, independent sources within the same news report. Keesing's Record of World Events was used as a secondary resource to help clarify ambiguous cases and to provide information on disputes for which Lexis-Nexis searches returned no matches. Project staff were instructed to save all of the news reports used to justify coding decisions, and those archives are available at our respective institutions. Coder instructions are available for examination at the project website, http://www.d.umn.edu/~mcapriol/.
For example, a 1983 dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan was coded as Table I provides a summary of all MIDs from 1980 through 2001 showing the number of violent MIDs and of MIDs in which more than one actor used violent force. For these disputes, representing 41% of the total number of violent MIDs, the research team was required to determine, using the procedure described above, which actor was the first to use violence.
As part of this research project, a second variable was also created (TAFUVF) to identify the state that used violent force first as well as the state that was the target of this first violent action. TAFUVF is a trichotomous variable with the state that was the target of the first use of violent force coded as -1, the state that used force first coded as 1, and with all other actors coded as 0. A third variable was created recording the date when the first use of violent force occurred (DFUVF). At present, DFUVF is available only for those cases in which both sides used force within the dispute. As this research continues, we intend to identify the date of first use of violence for all violent MIDs from 1980 to 2001.
We have not yet begun to tap the potential of FUVF, TAFUVF, and DFUVF in terms of understanding the dynamics of interstate conflict and conflict escalation. We have thus far focused on using FUVF as a dependent variable to help us assess the impact of state and societal level factors on aggressive state behavior during interstate conflict. TAFUVF and DFUVF allow for a nuanced assessment of conflict dynamics and issues of conflict duration subsequent to the use of force. TAFUVF is particularly useful for further understanding ally behavior, relative power of the target and first user of violence, and the role of joiners in dispute dynamics.
The Utility of FUVF
Perhaps the value of FUVF is best demonstrated by examining the relationship Table  II . The temporal domain of the tests encompasses 1980-2001, the period for which we have developed data on first use of violent force. As predictors, we include in the models four variables that are regularly employed in conflict analysis: measures of alliance membership, geographic proximity, power status, and regime type. Our purpose in constructing these tests is not to test hypotheses, but rather to identify and discuss theoretically interesting differences between dispute initiation and first use of violent force. The alliance and contiguity variables are continuous measures signifying the number of allies and number of contiguous (within 400 miles by water) states respectively. The major power and democracy variables are both binary indicators representing whether or not a state is a major power (China, France, Germany, Japan, USSR/Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) or a democracy as indicated by the Polity2 variable taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) .
As Table II shows, there are significant differences between MID initiation and first use of violence. In the initiation model, only the number of neighbors is statistically significant, a finding consistent with the role that geographical proximity plays in facilitating militarized conflict (Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000) . Of particular note is the finding that regime type has no significant impact on MID initiation, a result we would expect given the common understanding among most scholars that the democratic peace is a largely, although not exclusively, dyadic phenomenon (Chernoff, 2004 ). Here we see that states with democratic regimes are no more or less likely to be the first to undertake a militarized action in an interstate dispute than any other type of state. Likewise, neither major power status nor number of alliance partners has any significant impact on whether a given state will be the initiator of a MID.
When we turn our attention to first use of violent force, however, we find that predictors that were not significant in the initiation model become significant for first use of violence. Most interestingly, we find that states with democratic regimes are less likely to be the first to use violent force when involved in a MID than other types of states. A democratic state is less likely to use violent force first by a factor of .741. While results of the initiation model were consistent with most contemporary characterizations of the impact of regime type on interstate conflict behavior, the finding that democracies are less likely to use violent force first when involved in a MID is more in keeping with the expectations of those scholars who unsuccessfully sought to find evidence supporting a general trend toward democratic pacifism (Rummel, 1968; Small & Singer, 1976) . Moreover, this is a monadic effect independent of the regime characteristics of a democratic state's MID opponent. Given that the decision to use violence first when involved in an interstate conflict can be considered an unambiguously aggressive act, the finding reported here may lend support to a relatively straightforward application of the normative explanation of the democratic peace and the proposition that 'different norms of domestic political conduct will be expressed in terms of different patterns of international behavior' (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 625) . While it may be accurate that the risk of democratic states becoming involved in international conflicts, especially wars, is roughly the same as for non-democratic states (Weede, 1984) , our finding suggests that their conduct once engaged in interstate disputes differs in ways consistent with the normative explanation for the democratic peace. At the same time, the monadic nature of this observation may suggest that the impact of systemic anarchy on the conflict behavior of democracies is less absolute than has been suggested (Maoz & Russett, 1993) . In sum, this is a finding that deserves a more rigorous exploration than what we provide here. Finally, while we find that the impact of geographic proximity on likelihood to use violent force first is essentially on a par with its effect on MID initiation (odds ratios of 1.05 for FUVF compared to 1.07 for initiation), we see that major-power status, which was not a significant predictor of MID initiation, is significant for first use of violent force. We find that major powers are less likely to use force first by a factor of .446 compared to minor powers. This seems consistent with research demonstrating that levels of violence tend to be lower in disputes involving major powers compared with those in which disputants are minor powers only (Rasler & Thomson, 1999; Russett & Oneal, 2001 ). The finding that major powers are less likely to use violence first when involved in a militarized dispute may reflect the greater resources that major powers can bring to bear to help them manage disputes beyond application of military violence. It may also reflect the general tendency of satisfied states to be reluctant to use violent force internationally because they have more to lose (Lemke & Reed, 1996) . Beyond the significance for democracy when testing likelihood to use violence first during a militarized interstate dispute rather than dispute initiation, the difference in the significance of some of the control variables also points to the conceptual and behavioral differences between initiating a militarized dispute and using violence first once involved in such a dispute.
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Association of FUVF with Revisionism and Dispute Outcome
In addition to the multivariate analysis reported above, we also provide a brief discussion of measures of association between the FUVF variable and two additional MID variables that shed light on interstate conflict dynamics. In particular, we were interested in variables that can help us understand why states might use violent force first as a dispute strategy and whether that strategy pays off in terms of dispute outcome. Cross-tabs were calculated using SPSS. Given our interest in understanding the role that the use of violence plays, we examine for these tests volume 43 / number 6 / november 2006 746 only the subset of MIDs in which violent force was employed by one or more participants in a dispute.
Revisionist State
MID's revisionist state code is often used in conjunction with the dispute initiation variable (Side A) to try to capture more fully the question of 'who started it', that is, which state is really responsible for the dispute. The MID team wisely cautions against this (Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer, 2004: 138) , owing to the limitations inherent in the initiation coding. Yet the revisionist state code itself captures an important element in the dispute dynamic. It identifies that state, or states, in a dispute that is/are openly attempting to challenge the predispute status quo by making claims to a specific territory, attempting to overthrow a regime, or changing or not abiding by another state's policy (Jones, Bremer & Singer, 1996: 178) . When we look at those MIDs in which violence was used by either or both disputants, we find that in just over 77% of cases, the state that used violent force first was also the state challenging the predispute status quo. 1 This result seems to indicate a strong relationship between a desire to overturn the existing status quo and a willingness to resort to aggressive measures to accomplish that goal. It may also help account for the finding in the multivariate analysis that major powers, which are generally less likely to challenge the international status quo, are consequently less likely to use violent force first. What this result does not tell us, however, is whether certain types of revisionism are more likely to be associated with aggression than others. Specifically, it would be useful and instructive to discover whether states seeking to alter the territorial status quo are more likely to use violent force first compared to either policy or regime revisionism. This seems likely given other research showing that territorial disputes tend to be more severe than disputes driven by different goals (Senese & Vasquez, 2003; Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer, 2004) .
Dispute Outcome
Finally, we consider the efficacy of first using violent force as a conflict strategy. In short, do states that first use violent force tend to emerge victorious when the dust from the dispute finally settles? Before looking at this relationship, however, there is an important caveat. Relatively few militarized interstate disputes end with a clearcut winner. Out of 1,089 cases of states involved in violent militarized interstate disputes between 1980 and 2001, only 120, or 11% of the total, can be identified as winners using MID's codings for dispute outcome. We identified a state as the winner of a dispute if it achieved a victory, defined by MID as 'the favorable outcome achieved by one state through the use of militarized action that imposes military defeat upon the opponent' (Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer, 2004: 137) , or if its opponent yielded, defined by MID as 'the submission by one state to the demands made by another state . . . before the militarized forces of either state have secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield' (Ghosn, Palmer & Bremer, 2004: 137) . We find that using violent force first rarely leads to a positive result when we consider dispute outcome. Only 3.5% of first users of violent force prevail over their MID opponent. 2 In the other 96.5% of cases, first use of violence failed to produce victory.
Concluding Thoughts
The results of both the multivariate analysis and measures of association reveal interesting patterns and raise intriguing questions for future study. For the time period 1980-2001, we find that both democracies and major powers are less likely to use violent force first than non-democracies or minor powers. More often than not, first users of violence were also driven by a revisionist agenda. And yet, such a conflict strategy seems ill advised, given that first users of violent force were unlikely to see that strategy pay off with a victory in the dispute. We leave it to others to begin the process of further refining these tests and explaining the outcomes.
In our own research, we have used the FUVF variable as one of several measures of state conflict behavior during militarized interstate disputes. In short, our interest so far has been in using FUVF as an indicator of state aggressiveness -we have sought to understand the nature of states that use violent force first, not the nature of first use of violence itself. Yet, as the brief discussions above indicate, the FUVF variable has the potential to expand our understanding of dispute behavior more generally, to further test theories of aggression and the use of violence, and to facilitate state and societal level analyses. As with the MID project that was our inspiration, the data we now make publicly available are intended to allow the broader community of scholars to engage in even more detailed analysis of interstate conflict.
